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During the peak of the housing boom in Las Vegas, Russell,1 a mortgage
loan processor for a large bank, reviewed a mortgage application. Everything
appeared to be in order: this particular type of mortgage loan required no
income verification because the buyer had excellent credit and the home would
be an owner-occupied property. Russell approved the loan for the bank.
Unbeknownst to Russell and the bank, the applicant was actually a “straw
buyer,”2 using his name and credit to buy the house at the insistence of his
business partner, but not actually intending to live in the house. All the appli-
cant had to do was sign a few documents and both the applicant and his busi-
ness partner would profit from exploding housing prices. The applicant’s credit
would allow the pair to purchase a single-family residence for $295,000, and
then, before the first mortgage payment came due, they would flip the property,
that is, immediately sell the home, and profit from the home’s extraordinary
short-term appreciation. The applicant never planned on living in the house nor
making any mortgage payments, despite his execution of loan documents to the
contrary.
Unfortunately, housing prices did not continue their fantastic escalation
and the pair were unable to sell the home. Not surprisingly, neither the appli-
cant nor his business partner made any mortgage payments and the home went
into foreclosure. At the time of the home’s foreclosure, the house had a fair
market value of $265,000. However, the bank that relied on the applicant’s
information had too many similarly situated properties at the time of the fore-
closure and decided to keep the home in inventory until it could sell the home
at a later date.
Meanwhile, the financial institution became suspicious of the applicant
and realized he never even moved into the house, despite claiming on his Uni-
form Residential Loan Application that this would be an “owner-occupied”
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2014, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas. Thank you to Professors Jennifer Carr and Keith Rowley for your help
and support. Thank you also to the staff and the editors for your hard work.
1 This is a fictional story with corresponding fictional characters used for illustrative pur-
poses only. No offense is meant to any person coincidentally named Russell.
2 Mortgage Fraud Terms, Participants, and Documents, U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL., May 2010, at
32, 35.
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property.3 Concerned with an increase in mortgage fraud, the lender tipped off
authorities, who subsequently investigated and arrested the straw buyer and his
business partner. Almost a year later, the partners pled guilty and were sen-
tenced, inter alia, to pay restitution to the financial institution. At the time of
sentencing, the home had a fair market value of $145,000.4
The court ordered restitution based on the Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act (MVRA) concerning fraud and property.5 The victim, in this case the bank,
argued its amount of loss equaled $295,000 (the amount originally borrowed)
less the current fair market value of the property returned, $145,000; thus, the
court should order the defendants to pay restitution of $150,000. On the other
hand, the defendants argued that at the time the property was returned to the
financial institution, the value of the home was $265,000. And because the
bank had control over the property since that point in time, and had the ability
to sell it any time, the defendants should not be liable for the further declining
market conditions. Thus, the defendants argued they only owed restitution of
$30,000. Alternatively, the judge could consider a third possibility: recent rec-
ommendations from US Sentencing Guidelines. Under these new guidelines,
the court determines the fair market value of the home on the defendants’ sen-
tencing date.6 But, if the bank had not sold the home by that date, that fair
market value would be based on the county’s assessed value of the property. In
Clark County, where Las Vegas is situated, the Assessor’s Office updates prop-
erty values annually7 and, depending on the specific time frame in this hypo-
thetical, the assessment value can range from a lagging property assessment
valuing the home at $280,000 to a more current assessment valuing the home at
$125,000.
Which measure of restitution and subsequent calculation is best? That is,
which value most adequately compensates the injured victim without unfairly
burdening the defendants? The Ninth Circuit would side with the defendants in
this case, having previously held that the value of the home on the date the
bank gains control is the proper measure of restitution.8 Accordingly, the
defendants in this case would be ordered to pay only $30,000 in restitution. On
the other hand, the Seventh Circuit would hold that the “property” stolen was
3 For an example of a Form 1003 Uniform Residential Loan Application, see Uniform Resi-
dential Loan Application, FANNIE MAE, https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide_form
/1003rev.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
4 This illustration, while seemingly extreme, is comparable to the actual swings in housing
prices in Las Vegas during the boom and bust. See, e.g., STEPHEN P.A. BROWN, UNLV CTR.
FOR BUS. & ECON. RESEARCH, SOUTHERN NEVADA HOUSING MARKET SHOWS SIGNS OF
RECOVERY 1 (2012), available at http://cber.unlv.edu/commentary/CBER-28Nov2012.pdf.
For an impactful visual, see Home Price Index for Las Vegas, Nevada, ECON. RES. FED. RES.
BANK ST. LOUIS, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/LVXRNSA (last updated Feb. 25,
2014, 8:56 AM).
5 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
6 See infra Part IV (discussing Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts).
7 NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.260 (2013), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-361
.html#NRS361Sec260; Assessor: FAQ, CLARK COUNTY, NEV., http://www.clarkcountynv
.gov/depts/assessor/Pages/faq.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
8 See discussion of the Ninth Circuit method in Part III.A., infra; United States v. Smith,
944 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1991).
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the money used to finance the home purchase, and not the actual home.9 Subse-
quently, the “property” is not returned to the victim until the bank sells the
house and gets the entire amount it loaned to the defendants back. For that
reason, if the bank sold the home by the sentencing date for $145,000, the
defendants would be ordered to pay $150,000 in restitution. And if a judge
considered the US Sentencing Guidelines, she would look to the local
assessor’s office to determine the correct value. Thus, the amount of restitution
a defendant pays depends on where the mortgage fraud takes place and whether
the presiding judge considers the US Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly,
mortgage fraud restitution is not uniform throughout the United States.
This note discusses the circuit split in applying the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act of 1996 to mortgage fraud crimes—specifically, the difference
in the mortgage fraud restitution formula. In Part I, I provide an introduction to
mortgage fraud. In Part II, I provide background on the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act of 1996, which established a directive to courts to order restitu-
tion to identifiable victims. Further, the Act indicated, albeit imprecisely, that
the restitution amount is based on the property’s value on the sentencing date,
less the property’s “value” on the date the property is returned.
Regrettably, the Act does not provide a definition of the word “property,”
which has resulted in a circuit split. Three circuit courts calculate the
mandatory restitution as the property’s “value” based on the date the property is
returned—that is, the property’s fair market value on that date. On the other
hand, four circuits insist that the “value” of the property can only be determined
when the bank actually sells that property. In Part III, I will discuss the circuit
split where courts disagree on the “appropriate” restitution calculation.
In an effort to provide a uniform calculation, last year the US Sentencing
Commission proposed changes to the US Sentencing Guidelines. While the
Guidelines are only advisory and not mandatory, these recent amendments
result in a third possible calculation that I discuss in Part IV.
Finally, in Part V, I critique each of the three imperfect approaches. In
addition, I provide comparisons to various state foreclosure deficiency statutes
as an illustration of alternative calculations. I conclude by proposing an amend-
ment to the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act that, in the cases of collateral-
ized loans obtained by fraud, defines “property” as the actual property
fraudulently obtained: cash. In addition, I propose an additional “good faith”
clause to the amendment to prevent banks from holding onto a foreclosed prop-
erty longer than necessary. The sooner a property is sold, the sooner the bank
recuperates some of its lost funds and the sooner a defendant knows the restitu-
tion amount he must pay.
A. What is Mortgage Fraud?
In the hypothetical above, the partners executed mortgage fraud by using
the applicant’s name and credit as a “straw buyer.” That is, a person who
9 See discussion of the Seventh Circuit method in Part III.B, infra.; United States v. Robers,
698 F.3d 937, 939 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 470 (2013).
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allows his name to be used in the loan process but has no intention of actually
making any mortgage loan payments.10
Mortgage fraud comes in a variety of forms. For example, a person com-
mits loan origination fraud when he misrepresents or omits information on a
loan application upon which an underwriter ultimately relies to write a loan.11
Mortgage fraud can also occur with illicit programs aimed at current homeown-
ers who are having trouble with their payments.12 Lately, this type of foreclo-
sure rescue fraud is increasing.13 These types of scams focus on homeowners
on the verge of foreclosure. Criminals promise to “stop or delay the foreclosure
process,” and, in return, homeowners sign over their property to the
criminals.14
Mortgage fraud can also include “flopping.” Flopping occurs when a bank
agrees to a short sale with the homeowner who then attempts to get the lowest
price possible by purposefully damaging the soon-to-be-sold house.15 The
house is then bought by an accomplice, cleaned up, and immediately flipped for
a profit of upwards of 30 percent.16
In 2011, Nevada ranked second to Florida in the Mortgage Fraud Index
(MFI), a ranking of states based on reported fraud and misrepresentation inves-
tigations.17 The FBI investigates mortgage fraud through Suspicious Activity
Reports (SARs) filed by financial institutions.18 The number of mortgage fraud
SARs filed in 2011 was 93,508. To put this in perspective, in 2003 the number
of reports filed was less than 7,000.19 However, mortgage fraud may be
decreasing: 2012 SARs are down 25 percent compared to the previous year.20
10 Mortgage Fraud Terms, Participants, and Documents, supra note 2.
11 FIN. CRIMES INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2010 MORTGAGE
FRAUD REPORT: YEAR IN REVIEW 5 (2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services
/publications/mortgage-fraud-2010/mortgage-fraud-report-2010.
12 Id.
13 FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MORTGAGE LOAN
FRAUD UPDATE 14 (Oct. 2012), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/nr/files
/MLFUpdateQ22012_FINAL508.pdf.
14 Press Release, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, SARs Regard-
ing Foreclosure Rescue Scams Increase (Oct. 9, 2012), available at http://www.fincen.gov
/news_room/nr/html/Q22012/20121009.html.
15 Les Christie, Latest in Mortgage Fraud: Flopping, CNNMONEY (Oct. 23, 2012, 6:22
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/23/real_estate/mortgage-fraud-flopping.
16 Id.
17 LEXISNEXIS RISK SOLUTIONS, THE LEXISNEXIS 14TH ANNUAL MORTGAGE FRAUD
REPORT 8 (2012), available at http://mortgagefraudblog.com/images/stories/uploaded_docs
/mari.pdf.
18 FIN. CRIMES SECTION, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT TO




20 Press Release, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, FinCEN 2012
SAR Data Reveals Drop in Suspected Mortgage Fraud (Aug. 20, 2013), available at http://
www.fincen.gov/news_room/nr/html/20130820.html. However, it is important to note that it
can take years for a mortgage fraud scheme to be discovered, which delays suspicious activ-
ity reporting. Id.
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B. Why Does Mortgage Fraud Matter?
Mortgage fraud is a “significant contributor” to our economic crisis.21
Mortgage fraud has contributed to an increasing number of home foreclosures,
decreasing home prices, and tightening of credit because of investor losses
attributable to mortgage-backed securities.22 Further, “[t]he discovery of mort-
gage fraud via the mortgage industry loan review processes, quality control
measures, regulatory and industry referrals, and consumer complaints lags
behind economic indicators—often up to two years or more, with the impacts
[of the fraud] felt far beyond these years.”23 Undeniably, reports of mortgage
fraud persist and are continually emphasized in the news.24
Lenient underwriting standards and a booming housing market have
shaped a perfect backdrop for fraud to thrive.25 However, “[b]y 2007, real
estate values began to fall and mortgage lenders began experiencing large
losses due to fraud, reducing their ability to fund new mortgage loans.”26
The economic implications of mortgage fraud are staggering. The actual
dollar amount attributed to mortgage fraud is unknown, however in 2010 alone
“more than $10 billion in loans originated with fraudulent application data.”27
Moreover, in fiscal year 2012, 70,291 SARs were filed with losses of $2.69
billion.28 And while the number of mortgage fraud instances has decreased, the
dollar amounts involved in instances of fraud has increased.29
C. Why Restitution?
Until the early 1980s, courts did not habitually consider restitution as part
of sentencing guidelines.30 In fact, if a court ordered restitution, it was usually
based on the defendant’s ability to pay.31 The passage of the Victim and Wit-
21 Benjamin B. Wagner, Why Mortgage Fraud Matters, U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL., May 2010, at
1, 1.
22 Id.
23 FIN. CRIMES INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 11, at 6 n.a. R
24 See, e.g., Jeff German, Homeowners Still at Risk, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Dec. 14, 2012, at
B1 (judge orders Las Vegas man to pay over $320,000 in restitution for impersonating a
mortgage agent and claiming he could provide mortgage relief to homeowners); Chris
Olwell, $10 Million in Restitution Ordered in Mortgage Fraud, NEWS HERALD (Jan. 29,
2013, 3:44 PM), http://www.newsherald.com/news/crime-public-safety/10-million-in-resti
tution-ordered-in-mortgage-fraud-1.86333 (judge issued large restitution order for five
defendants in straw buyer scheme). Financial institutions have also been accused of mort-
gage fraud. See, e.g., Danielle Douglas, New York Sues Credit Suisse over Mortgages,
WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2012, at A14.
25 Wagner, supra note 21. R
26 Id.
27 FIN. CRIMES INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 11, at 6. R
28 These Scams Hit Us Right Where We Live, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi
.gov/about-us/investigate/white_collar/mortgage-fraud/mortgage_fraud (last visited Feb. 21,
2014).
29 Krista Franks Brock, Mortgage Fraud Instances Decline, Per-Case Value Rises in Third
Quarter, MREPORT (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.themreport.com/articles/mortgage-fraud
-instances-decline-per-case-value-rises-2012-12-03.
30 Matthew Spohn, Note, A Statutory Chameleon: The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act’s
Challenge to the Civil/Criminal Divide, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2001).
31 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-664, CRIMINAL DEBT: OVERSIGHT AND
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES IN COLLECTION PROCESSES 34 (2001).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-2\NVJ215.txt unknown Seq: 6 30-APR-14 10:59
Spring 2014] TURNING RESTITUTION UPSIDE-DOWN 645
ness Protection Act (VWPA) in 1982,32 its subsequent revision in 1986, and
later the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) in 199633 empowered
federal judges to order restitution to victims of certain crimes34 without consid-
eration of the defendant’s ability to pay.35 Unfortunately, victims receive only a
fraction of the costs from crimes through restitution,36 as not all defendants
have the resources to pay the restitution and their income potential diminishes
significantly once they are in jail. However, as courts consider both the MVRA
and the frequently cited public policy argument for restitution (making the vic-
tim whole), courts consequently order restitution awards to mortgage fraud vic-
tims.37 Indeed, “[v]ictims in mortgage fraud cases are statutorily entitled to
restitution.”38
D. The Split
When a court convicts a defendant of mortgage fraud, and the defendant’s
return of the property alone is not enough to fully restore the identified victim,
the court will try to offset this deficiency in one of two ways. The Second,
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits determine restitution based on the property’s fair mar-
ket value the day the victim receives title to the property. The Third, Eighth,
Tenth, and, most recently, Seventh Circuits hold the shortage is calculated
based on the actual sale of the collateral real estate. Thus, the value of the
property is unknown until the property has been sold and the lender receives
the net proceeds. Consequently, this split “sets up a potential case for the U.S.
Supreme Court to decide whether the MVRA requires a court to determine
restitution based on the fair market value of collateral real estate on the date it
is returned to a victim . . . or the cash value upon foreclosure sale.”39
II. THE MANDATORY VICTIMS RESTITUTION ACT OF 1996
Congress first enacted legislation in support of victims’ rights with the
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA).40 The act included a
broad provision for victim restitution.41 In considering the bill, the Committee
on the Judiciary indicated that
32 Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248.
33 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012).
34 Spohn, supra note 30, at 1015. R
35 FINES AND RESTITUTION IN FEDERAL COURTS 7–8 (Maxwell R. Silverstein ed., 2003).
36 PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 167 (2d ed. 2010).
For example, the court ordered $250 million in restitution against the convicted defendants
from the World Trade Center bombings, but the four offenders have paid less than 0.0012
percent of that amount. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 31, at 35–36. R
37 See, e.g., United States v. James, 564 F.3d 1237, 1245–46, 1249 (10th Cir. 2009).
38 Joseph T. Dixon, III, Last but Not Least: Sentencing and Restitution, U.S. ATT’YS’
BULL., May 2010, at 28, 31.
39 Joe Forward, In Mortgage Fraud Case, Offset Value Based on Cash Recouped in Fore-
closure Sale, STATE BAR WIS. (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications
/Pages/General-Article.aspx?ArticleID=10131.
40 OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES
FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE 7 (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov
/archive/olp/ag_guidelines.pdf.
41 Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 5, 96 Stat. 1248, 1253.
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[t]he principle of restitution is an integral part of virtually every formal system of
criminal justice, of every culture and every time. It holds that, whatever else the
sanctioning power of society does to punish its wrongdoers, it should also insure that
the wrongdoer is required to the degree possible to restore the victim to his or her
prior state of well-being.42
However, while this report indicated the importance of requiring restitu-
tion, the Act only provided that a Court may order the defendant to pay
restitution.43
Congress expanded and amended legislation for victims in future legisla-
tion,44 most notably in the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996.45 Con-
gress identified one of the primary purposes of the Act as “requiring Federal
criminal defendants to pay full restitution to the identifiable victims of their
crimes.”46 In addition, Congress specifically made mandatory restitution appli-
cable to fraudulent crimes against property.47 Moreover, Congress explicitly
identified the legislation’s purpose:
This legislation is needed to ensure that the loss to crime victims is recognized, and
that they receive the restitution that they are due. It is also necessary to ensure that
the offender realizes the damage caused by the offense and pays the debt owed to the
victim as well as to society. Finally, this legislation is needed to replace an existing
patchwork of different rules governing orders of restitution under various Federal
criminal statutes with one consistent procedure.48
If restitution is appropriate, a court may only award it to identifiable victims. A
federal crime victim is defined as “a person directly and proximately harmed as
a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of
Columbia.”49 Further, restitution is only applicable to crime victims when the
defendant is actually convicted.50 In addition, “[a] ‘victim’s’ participation in a
fraudulent mortgage scheme . . . will generally exclude the victim from
restitution.”51
It should also be remembered that restitution, “like all criminal sanctions
. . . is a sanction of limited application.”52 Restitution is only complete, then,
when payment of the obligation is complete.53 In jurisdictions that allow
“extended or nominal payment mechanisms,” which can prolong the repay-
42 S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 30 (1982).
43 Victim and Witness Protection Act, § 5, 96 Stat. at 1253.
44 OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 40. R
45 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012).
46 VICTIM RESTITUTION ACT OF 1995, S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 12 (1995).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e) (2012).
50 CHARLES DOYLE, CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS ACT 6 (2008).
51 Travis Burchart, Victims of Mortgage Fraud Bar Themselves from Restitution, LEXIS-
NEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM (March 31, 2011, 9:49 AM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnews
room/real-estate/b/real-estate-law-blog/archive/2011/03/31/how-the-victims-of-mortgage
-fraud-barred-themselves-from-restitution.aspx. For example, if a mortgage loan processor
participated in a straw buyer mortgage fraud scheme, a court would not consider the bank a
victim because the bank participated in the scheme.
52 TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 36.
53 Id.
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ment,54 the variable time value of money may cause any restitution to be tech-
nically incomplete, even once the balance is repaid in full.55
Unfortunately, only 17.4 percent of measured property offenses resulted in
criminal charges.56 Where convictions of mortgage fraud do result, however,
courts consider the language of the MVRA in awarding restitution:
The court may also order restitution . . . . The order may require that such defendant
. . . return the property to the owner of the property . . . or . . . if return of the property
. . . is impossible, impractical, or inadequate, pay an amount equal to the greater of
. . . the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or destruction, or . . . the
value of the property on the date of sentencing, less the value (as of the date the
property is returned) of any part of the property that is returned . . . .57
Accordingly, when the return of the property is inadequate restitution, the
MVRA states that the offset value must be determined as of the date the prop-
erty is returned. However, the statute is silent as exactly how to measure the
value of the property on that date.58 Consequently, in the absence of clear
guidelines, three possible formulas have arisen.59
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
With a lack of clarity in defining “property” in the MVRA, the circuit
courts have split in their interpretations of restitution. Two circuits have fol-
lowed the Ninth Circuit in determining that the value of the property is the fair
market value on the date of the property’s return, arguing that once the property
is returned to the victim, the victim has control over the property and may
dispose of the property whenever it chooses. Accordingly, these courts calcu-
late the fair market value of the property based on the date the property is
returned rather than waiting for a later sale. Conversely, four circuits hold that
the “property” can only be valued when the house is eventually sold and the
proceeds are provided to the victim because cash, not real estate, was the actual
property the defendants took from the victim.
A. The Ninth Circuit Method
A bank would say a restitution calculation can only be determined when
the property is sold, but a defendant would argue that if a bank holds on to the
property in a declining market, it is unfair for the defendant to pay more in
restitution than what the property was worth when the victim regained control
of it. The Ninth Circuit method considers the fairness of a bank refraining from
selling a property immediately, and ultimately agrees with the defendant’s
argument.
54 Id. at 170.
55 For an introduction to the time value of money concept, see generally JACK R. KAPOOR
ET AL., PERSONAL FINANCE (10th ed. 2011).
56 TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 36 (analyzing 2008 Uniform Crime Reports).
57 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) (2012) (emphasis added).
58 United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2006).
59 See infra Part III (discussing the circuit split and two different calculation formulas);
infra Part IV (discussing updated US Sentencing Guidelines addressing another possible
calculation).
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After the passage of the Victim and Witness Protection Act in 1982, the
Ninth Circuit became the first circuit court to consider mortgage fraud restitu-
tion.60 The court turned to an earlier decision in a timber theft case for property
valuation guidance.61 In United States v. Tyler, the defendant was ordered to
pay restitution for his theft of timber from a national forest.62 However, the
victim, the federal government, did not sell the timber upon its seizure and in
fact purposefully held onto the timber, claiming it needed the timber for evi-
dentiary purposes in its case against Tyler.63 During the period between the
arrest and sentencing, timber prices declined.64 The district court found that the
amount of restitution equaled the difference of the timber’s value from sentenc-
ing date and the higher value when defendant actually stole the timber.65 The
Ninth Circuit disagreed with the District Court and held that the defendant
should not have an increased restitution when the victim decides to retain the
property.66 The court reasoned that the defendant’s conduct did not cause the
subsequent loss the government experienced and therefore restitution was prop-
erly calculated as the property’s value on the date the victim regained control of
the timber.67
The Ninth Circuit subsequently applied this logic to a mortgage fraud con-
text in United States v. Smith, where the defendant obtained loans secured by
speculative real estate.68 The court determined that the credit against restitution
should be based on the value of the property on the date title is transferred to
the victim.69 The court noted, “[a]s of that date, the new owner had the power
to dispose of the property and receive compensation.”70 Because the victim has
control over the property’s sale once the property is returned, “[v]alue should
therefore be measured by what the financial institution would have received in
a sale as of that date.”71
The Smith decision served as the “keystone for all of the subsequent deci-
sions.”72 The Ninth Circuit reinforced this valuation method in later cases.73
60 United States v. Smith, 944 F.2d 618, 621 (9th Cir. 1991).
61 Id. at 625.
62 United States v. Tyler, 767 F.2d 1350, 1351 (9th Cir. 1985).
63 Id. at 1352.
64 Id. at 1351.
65 Id. Because this case was prior to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, the district
court based its reasoning on 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651 and 3579. Id.
66 Id. at 1352–53.
67 Id. at 1352.
68 United States v. Smith, 944 F.2d 618, 625 (9th Cir. 1991).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. (emphasis added).
72 United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 947 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 470
(2013).
73 United States v. Davoudi, 172 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 1999) (case remanded for resti-
tution determination for value on date property returned rather than value at victim’s sale of
property); United States v. Catherine, 55 F.3d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1995) (Ninth Circuit
found trial court abused its discretion when it based restitution order on property’s value on
date of sale rather than value on date when property returned to victim); United States v.
Hutchison, 22 F.3d 846, 849, 856 (9th Cir. 1993) (defendant who fraudulently secured home
refinance loan had restitution order reduced to reflect the value on the date the property was
returned to victim in consideration of declining Arizona market).
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Further, in United States v. Gossi, the court elaborated on its prior decisions
that value should be based on the date the victim has control over the prop-
erty.74 Specifically, the court noted that what comes with control of the prop-
erty is the power to dispose,75 which allows the victim to sell the property
anytime and provides no immediate calculation of restitution. Subsequently, the
court cited Smith, stating the “[v]alue should therefore be measured by what the
financial institution would have received in a sale as of that date.”76
Finally, this past year, the Ninth Circuit upheld its mortgage fraud restitu-
tion calculation in United States v. Yeung. In Yeung, the defendant enlisted five
people in a scheme involving false information on straw buyers’ loan applica-
tions in order to purchase and refinance homes in Northern California during
the booming housing market.77 The district court considered a sentencing
memo indicating that Yeung should pay restitution in the amount of the “out-
standing principal balance on the defaulted loans less any money recovered
from a sale of the properties used as collateral for the loans.”78 Applying the
US Sentencing Guidelines, rather than the MVRA, the district court ordered a
restitution award in excess of $1.3 million.79 The Court of Appeals, however,
indicated that a financial institution has control of the property either when the
property is sold or when, citing Smith, the lender “had the power to dispose of
the property and receive compensation,” and therefore restitution should be
based on the fair market value on the date the property is returned.80
One distinction in Yeung, however, involved a loan purchased on the sec-
ondary market.81 One of the loans had been sold from the originating lender to
a loan purchaser at a discount. The court indicated that the “property” in such
circumstances is the actual loan, and not the original real property.82 The court
determined that the restitution calculation in this type of circumstance must
consider how much the loan purchaser paid for the loan, “less the value of the
real property collateral as of the date the victim took control of the collateral
property.”83
Further, the court disagreed with the district court’s calculation of one
property’s value.84 The district court determined the value of one of the proper-
ties as $363,863—the amount the victim received from the property’s sale.85
However, this sale did not occur until sixteen months after the victim took
control of the property.86 Accordingly, the court found the actual value should
be determined from the date the victim took control of the property.87
74 United States v. Gossi, 608 F.3d 574, 577 (9th Cir. 2010).
75 Id. at 578.
76 Id. (quoting Smith, 944 F.2d at 625).
77 United States v. Yeung, 672 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 2012).
78 Id. at 599.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 601 (quoting Smith, 944 F.2d at 625).
81 Id. at 601–02.
82 Id. at 602.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 604–05.
85 Id. at 604.
86 Id.
87 Id.
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Two circuits follow the Ninth Circuit’s restitution calculation. In both
United States v. Reese88 and United States v. Holley,89 the Fifth Circuit main-
tained that a property’s value is determined based on the date the collateral
property is returned to the lender.90 Further, in Holley, the Fifth Circuit specifi-
cally analogized the facts of Holley to the Smith case in subscribing to the
Ninth Circuit calculation.91
Relatedly, in United States v. Boccagna,92 the Second Circuit performed
an extensive analysis of how property value should be measured, ultimately
agreeing with the Ninth and Fifth Circuits.93 The Boccagna court noted that the
MVRA does not define how to determine the value of property.94 Instead, the
court stated, the “law appears to contemplate the exercise of discretion by sen-
tencing courts in determining the measure of value appropriate to restitution
calculation in a given case.”95 The court found the property’s sale price was
lower than the fair market value and remanded the case to determine this value
as part of the restitution calculation.96
B. The Seventh Circuit Method
In contrast, four circuit courts presume the fair market value is determined
only by the actual sale of the property. I have referred to this calculation as the
Seventh Circuit method because of that court’s recent decision in which it ana-
lyzed all circuit holdings to date.97 However, these decisions begin outside of
that circuit.
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Himler, observed that the return of
the property would be inadequate to compensate the victim, and explicitly dis-
agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s view that value of the property is “as of the date
the victim took control of [it].”98 The court noted instead that real estate is an
illiquid asset, and “is only worth what you can get for it.”99 Thus, the court held
that restitution would equal the original loan amount, less the eventual amount
88 United States v. Reese, 998 F.2d 1275, 1284 (5th Cir. 1993).
89 United States v. Holley, 23 F.3d 902, 915 (5th Cir. 1994).
90 Reese, 998 F.2d at 1284 (indicating that when the property has been returned to the
lender, “the value of such property should constitute a partial return of the ‘cash loan pro-
ceeds’ ”); Holley, 23 F.3d at 915. Citing the Ninth Circuit decision in Smith, the court agreed
the value of the returned property “should therefore be measured by what the financial insti-
tution would have received in a sale as of that date. Any reduction in value after [the defen-
dant] lost title to the property stems from a decision by the new owners to hold on to the
property.” Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 944 F.2d 618, 625).
91 Holley, 23 F.3d at 915.
92 United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2006).
93 Id. at 112 n.2.
94 Id. at 114.
95 Id. at 114–15. “Title 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A) states that a ‘court shall order restitution
to each victim in the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court and
without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.’ ” Id. (emphasis in
original).
96 Id. at 119–20.
97 United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 939 (7th Cir. 2012).
98 United States v. Himler, 355 F.3d 735, 744–45 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing United States v.
Lomow, 266 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001)).
99 Id. at 745.
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recovered from a sale.100 Surprisingly in this case, waiting until the sale actu-
ally occurred resulted in the defendant paying less restitution than he would
have if the fair market value had been used.101 The condominium in Himler
sold for significantly more than its presumed value when title was transferred,
due to favorable market conditions.102
The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. James, also concluded that value is
based on the actual foreclosure sales price and not an appraised value when the
property is returned to the mortgage holder.103 The court noted that the MVRA
“generally uses the term ‘value,’ and does not limit calculation of ‘value’ only
to the use of the ‘fair market value’ of the property at issue.”104 Further,
because the statute does not specifically mention value as being fair market
value, there are other examples of value that may be appropriate, such as fore-
closure sales price and replacement price.105 The court subsequently noted that
value can be a flexible concept, and a court with discretionary powers should
keep in mind the purpose of restitution—to make the victim whole.106 The
court concluded, therefore, that the foreclosure sale price in that case reflected a
more accurate measure of the victim’s loss.107
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Statman, used the fore-
closure sale price of a fraudulently purchased bakery business in calculating the
restitution award to a state’s small business-funding agency.108 While the
defendant wanted the court to consider the appraised value of the bakery, the
court cited James and determined that a foreclosure sale price was a permissi-
ble calculation method.109 The court also agreed with the Tenth Circuit; its
decision aligns with the public policy concerns, which justify the existence of
restitution in the first place—the need to make victims whole for the actual
loss.110 While this case involved financial fraud, and not mortgage fraud per se,
the chosen calculation method aligns this circuit with the sale-price camp.
Most recently, in United States v. Robers, the Seventh Circuit joined the
Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits concluding “it is proper to determine the
offset value [of property that is returned] based on the eventual amount
recouped by the victim following sale of the collateral real estate.”111 The court
observed that because the victim loaned cash to the defendants to purchase the
property, the cash was therefore the “property” taken, not a home.112 Basing its
opinion on the plain language of the MVRA, the Seventh Circuit decided that




103 United States v. James, 564 F.3d 1237, 1246 (10th Cir. 2009).
104 Id. at 1245.
105 Id. at 1245–46.
106 Id. at 1246.
107 Id.
108 United States v. Statman, 604 F.3d 529, 532, 538 (8th Cir. 2010).
109 Id. at 538.
110 Id.
111 United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 939 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
112 Id.
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value can only be determined by the amount of cash returned to the victim from
a sale.113
IV. YET ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE—US SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The US Sentencing Guidelines are advisory rules that set out uniform sen-
tencing guidelines for various offenses.114 The Guidelines are not mandatory,
and while judges have discretion in sentencing, courts must consider the Guide-
lines in determining a defendant’s sentence.115 Moreover, a court of appeals
reviewing a sentence that follows the Guidelines will consider the sentencing
reasonable per se.116
Under these Guidelines, the factors considered when imposing a sentence
include restitution to the victim.117 Further, the Guidelines state that, “[i]n the
case of an identifiable victim, the court shall . . . enter a restitution order for the
full amount of the victim’s loss, if such order is authorized under 18 U.S.C. . . .
§ 3663.”118
The US Sentencing Commission annually reviews the current Guidelines
and proposes amendments to reflect inadequacies in recent sentences.119
Recent revisions to the Guidelines, however, are not consistent with the latest
Seventh Circuit decision in Robers. In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Congress issued a directive to the US Sentencing
Guideline Commission to review and amend federal sentencing guidelines
related to “persons convicted of fraud offenses relating to financial institutions
or federally related mortgage loans and any other similar provisions of law.”120
The amendment subsequently attempts to address the inconsistencies with
Application Note 3(E) and “credits against loss rule,” which offsets a victim’s
loss by any credit the victim has already received.121 In general, the rule
deducts the fair market value of the property returned to the victim from the
amount of restitution the defendant is required to pay.122 In other words, the
restitution is offset by the collateral’s fair market value.
The Commission specifically addressed the situation that the circuit courts
have wrestled with—when the victim gets the collateral back but has not dis-
posed of the property, resulting in a problematic value calculation.123 The
Commission noted this and, in an attempt to provide uniform guidelines, it
proposed two changes.124 The first change established a specific date of the fair
113 Id. at 942.
114 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2013).
115 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264–65 (2005).
116 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007).
117 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7) (2012).
118 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.1(a)(1) (2013).
119 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2013).
120 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1079A, 124 Stat. 1376, 2078 (2010).
121 Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,226, 28,228 (May 11,
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market value determination: “the date on which the guilt of the defendant has
been established.”125 The second change “establishes a rebuttable presumption
that the most recent tax assessment value of the collateral is a reasonable esti-
mate of the fair market value.”126 The Commission suggests that a court may
consider the accuracy of this measure by examining factors such as how current
the assessment is and the jurisdiction’s calculation process.127
In sum, a court ordering restitution following these Guidelines would
establish the value of the property based on the official date of the defendant’s
guilt. In addition, if the property has been returned to the victim but remains
unsold, a court will use the local tax assessor’s value of the property to deter-
mine the property’s value.
V. CRITIQUE OF THE THREE CALCULATIONS
The absence of a definition for the term “property” in the MVRA is the
root of the different applications of the statute throughout the country. “When
the court defines ‘property,’ the question is whether the statute refers to the
property stolen or the property returned. They are not necessarily equivalent,
particularly in the context of complex financial instruments . . . .”128 However,
as stated previously, the Act’s purpose is to make the victim whole, and no
matter which formula is used, each calculation has the potential to not achieve
this goal.
A. The Ninth Circuit Method: Control as the Impetus
There are several advantages to the Ninth Circuit mortgage fraud restitu-
tion calculation method, which holds that the fair market value should be calcu-
lated based on the date the property is returned to the financial institution
victim. First, the date reflects the date that control over the property has been
returned to the victims. Accordingly, the bank then has the power to dispose of
the property at its discretion without additionally penalizing the defendant if the
victim refrains from selling the property on that date. For example, a victim
may decide to hold on to the property, as in United States v. Tyler129 or United
States v. Smith,130 coincidental with a declining market. A victim may have too
many properties in inventory to immediately put a particular property up for
sale. Or a victim may be making a calculated business decision to retain the
property for a certain period of time for accounting purposes. No matter the
purpose behind the retention, it is unfair to place the additional penalty that
coincides with declining real estate prices on the defendant who had no control




128 Sean T. Carnathan, Circuits Split on Valuing Offset Against Criminal Restitution,
A.B.A. LITIG. NEWS (Nov. 19, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews
/top_stories/111912-criminal-restitution.html.
129 United States v. Tyler, 767 F.2d 1350, 1352 (9th Cir. 1985).
130 United States v. Smith, 944 F.2d 618, 625 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Second, this specific date requires no guesswork when attempting to cal-
culate the amount of restitution, which results in better efficiency. On the date
the bank gets the property back, an appraisal can determine the property’s fair
market value. The court can immediately calculate the restitution amount with
this figure. Waiting until the property actually sells could result in a delay of
months or years to determine how much the actual proceeds from the sale are.
As a result, the court has an almost immediate figure to apply to the calculation
and can order the restitution award right away.
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit calculation method has some consid-
erable weaknesses. First, real estate is an illiquid asset,131 and determining fair
market value of an illiquid asset is difficult. An appraisal only suggests what
the house could sell for, not what the house actually will sell for. In addition,
appraisals are based on historical data of home sales, and during sharp market
increases or decreases an appraisal will not reflect the most up-to-date real
estate prices.132
Second, the recent housing bubble created an economic environment
where home prices decreased at a radical rate. Traditionally, such sharp
declines are not a concern with real estate over the long run because, while real
estate prices fluctuate, they eventually trend upward.133 However, in situations
like the recent drops in home values, the victim-lender can be punished for the
market decline, despite the fact the victim was actively trying to sell the prop-
erty. In addition, amidst tightening credit conditions, fewer buyers may qualify
to purchase a home. This results in too much supply, not enough demand, and
consequently puts further downward pressure on home prices. The victim-
lender is therefore penalized for market conditions beyond its control and con-
sequently does not receive complete restitution.
Further, a victim financial institution is not in the business of selling
homes; it is in the business of making collateralized mortgage loans for quali-
fied buyers. Not only will the lender have costs associated with selling the
home (for example, carrying costs or realtor commissions), the lender cannot
make a sale magically happen, especially if the home is situated in a market
flooded with other foreclosure sales.134 Thus, when the lender eventually sells
the home, it can potentially face a greater loss, an inequity beyond its control.
B. The Seventh Circuit Method: Cash Proceeds are the “Property”
As discussed in Part II, the Seventh Circuit, along with three other circuits,
requires a sale of the property in order to establish the net proceeds offsetting a
restitution award. These circuits distinguish that the property fraudulently
131 See United States v. Himler, 355 F.3d 735, 745 (3d Cir. 2004).
132 Marcie Geffner, Home Appraisals Come Under More Scrutiny, MSN REAL ESTATE,
http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=24569959 (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
133 Sara Clemence, Real Estate Vs. Stocks, FORBES (May 27, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://www
.forbes.com/2005/05/27/cx_sc_0527home.html.
134 For example, consider if a lender attempted to put a home on the market in Las Vegas in
the first quarter of 2011 where one in every thirty-one houses was in foreclosure. Melinda
Fulmer, Foreclosure Rates: 20 Cities with Highest Filings and State-by-State Rankings,
MSN REAL ESTATE, http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=28364347 (last
visited Feb. 21, 2014).
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obtained was the cash proceeds to finance a real estate purchase, not the actual
home. Thus, this method recognizes the illiquidity of real estate and instead
requires cash proceeds from a property’s sale; therefore, no return of the prop-
erty for restitution purposes occurs with just the transfer of title or “control”
over the property.
In addition, this method provides a more exact amount to the restitution
calculation. With an appraisal, a court only has an approximation of what the
house is worth. With an actual sale, the court knows specifically what the home
sold for, and also has information on the true net proceeds to the lender.
Finally, this method also provides a buffer of protection for a victim trying
to sell a property in a declining housing market. If the victim is unable to sell
the property immediately, and home prices continue to plummet, the victim
will not be financially punished by an ensuing lower sales price of the property.
Thus, by treating the property as cash proceeds and not calculating the restitu-
tion award until there is a sale of the property, this allows the victim to come
closer to achieving full restitution because the funds returned are the original
amount that was taken.
This calculation method, however, has some distinct disadvantages. First,
calculating the amount of time a home will be on the market is a challenge. For
example, in a downturn economy, is it appropriate for the defendants to wait
for the home to sell for months or years? At what point should the restitution
award sentence be official? Without an established time period for a requisite
sale, there will be a decrease of both efficiency and certainty as the defendant
will have to wait longer to find out what the value of the property is and there-
fore how much restitution is necessary.
In addition, what if the lender purposely holds on to the property longer
than necessary? Indeed, victim banks could make a “business decision” to hold
onto a property for years before attempting to sell.135 This type of allowance
does not encourage an efficient method of asset redistribution, which can delay
economic recovery in a down economy. Further, what if the victim holds an
improper foreclosure auction—for example, by failing to advertise the foreclo-
sure sale—and subsequently purchases the home itself for an amount far lower
than fair market value because of a (not surprising) lack of buyers? Should the
lender be rewarded for its misbehavior? On the other hand, some would argue
that between the two parties—a convicted criminal who attempted to defraud a
financial institution and a more innocent lender who trusted the criminal bor-
rower—the defendant should absorb the risk.
Further, it is possible in a booming housing market that a defendant will
owe no restitution. For example, if the defendant fraudulently obtained a home
loan for $200,000 and the victim lender subsequently sold the property for
$205,000, the defendant will be absolved from restitution. However, if part of
the goal of restitution is to make the victim whole, the victim is more than
compensated in a booming housing market.
135 Daniel Colbert, Foreclosing Restitution: When Has a Lender’s Property Been
“Returned?”, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (Nov. 26, 2013, 10:16 PM), http://americancriminallaw
review.com/Drupal/blogs/blog-entry/foreclosing-restitution-when-has-lender’s-property
-been-“returned”-11-26-2013.
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Moreover, this type of calculation can have an adverse effect on other
types of property. Knowing that the value of the property is not calculated until
the item is actually sold, a criminal has little incentive to actually return the
property. This would not be a concern for real property, but the same legal
framework could be applied to other forms of collateral that can be moved and
hidden, like cars. Thus, a thief can choose to hold on to the property or never
return the property because of a lack of incentive to return it immediately.
Accordingly, “[t]he decision is focused on the statute’s goal of making victims
whole but potentially interferes with the statute’s goal of returning property to
victims.”136 Consequently, “[i]f a defendant is going to be on the hook for the
offset amount regardless of when the property is sold, then why return the prop-
erty? Also, the decision may have the unintended consequence of interfering
with the marketplace . . . .”137
Finally, the loan in question in these circumstances is for a collateralized
asset. The actual home provided security to the lender. As such, the lender bore
the risk when it made the loan; however, the lender also understood it could
foreclose on the home in case of default. Thus, this cost of doing business is
already accounted for and a victim lender understands this type of risk when
providing mortgage loans.
C. US Sentencing Guidelines: Local Property Assessment is the Real
“Value”
As discussed in Part IV, the US Sentencing Guidelines establish the date
of valuation as the conviction date of the defendant. In addition, if the property
has not sold by that date, the local property tax assessor’s value of the home is
the value of the property for restitution calculation purposes. There are several
advantages to this approach. First, if every circuit applied this approach, these
guidelines would result in a uniform application throughout the country and
would eliminate the conflicting restitution awards. In addition, this approach
sets a number that can be calculated and independently verified. An individual
could easily confirm the tax assessor’s value of the property and calculate the
restitution.
Moreover, the Guidelines allow flexibility.138 For example, if a court
determines that an assessed value is too divergent from a property’s fair market
value, the court has discretion to address these differences and assign a fair
market value.139
The Guideline method, however, has potential disadvantages. First, as pre-
viously noted, the assessed value may not be near the fair market value of the
property, and a battle of experts may ensue as both the defendant and the victim
claim otherwise. In addition, this discrepancy may afford too much discretion
to judges when the goal of the Guidelines is to set a uniform policy.
136 Carnathan, supra note 128.
137 Id.
138 Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,226, 28,228 (May 11,
2012) (codified at U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E) (2013)).
139 Id.
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In addition, this approach disregards the Seventh Circuit method recogniz-
ing that the property taken was the actual cash for the home loan. Instead, by
relying on a tax assessor’s value if the home remains unsold, the Commission
determined that the “property” is the tangible real estate, and not the cash that
was lent. Again, if the victim were unable to sell the home in a declining hous-
ing market, the restitution award would fail to compensate the victim for its
true loss.
D. Alternative Methods of Calculation – State Deficiency Statutes
The problematic issue of fair market assessment is not unique to restitu-
tion. Every state and the District of Columbia have a deficiency statute,
whereby a lender can obtain a deficiency judgment to recover the difference
between a foreclosure sale price and the current outstanding balance owed on
the mortgage loan.140 Not every jurisdiction, however, calculates this defi-
ciency in the same way. For example, Nevada calculates the home value based
on the actual sale price, not the fair market value when the property is returned
to the lender.141 However, the court may also consider the home’s appraised
value in its determination.142
Some states maintain that a foreclosure sale price determines the value of
the home when calculating a deficiency judgment.143 In other words, these
states determine that a property’s value is only determined at the time of the
property’s sale. Therefore, this calculation is similar to the Seventh Circuit
method whereby a property’s value can only be determined following a sale of
the real estate.
Other states consider the fair market value of the property when consider-
ing a deficiency judgment. States that consider the fair market value at the time
the property is returned coincide with the Ninth Circuit calculation method.
Notably, some of these states are states that have had a high number of foreclo-
sures and are within the Ninth Circuit: for example, Arizona and California.144
Other states provide that the courts have discretion to determine the appro-
priate value of the property.145 This discretion is analogous to the alternative
offered by US Sentencing Guidelines. This alternative is available when a court
deems the property’s assessed value is inappropriate and provides that a court
has authority to consider other evidence in its determination of a property’s
value.
Thus, just as there is a lack of uniformity in the restitution calculation
depending on which state you live in, there is a corresponding lack of uniform-
ity regarding deficiency judgments. While most states follow the foreclosure
140 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 (1997).
141 NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.455(1) (2013).
142 NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.457(1) (2013).
143 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-49-105 (2012); D.C. CODE § 42-816 (2001); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-6-902 (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.100(3)(a)(1) (2012).
144 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-814 (2013); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West 2013).
See also Fulmer, supra note 134 (showing that Arizona and California ranked second and
third, respectively, in foreclosure filings in the first quarter of 2011).
145 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-108 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-5-118 (Supp.
2013).
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sale approach recognizing the property’s value can only be determined with an
actual sale, this approach does not account for the amount of time a financial
institution can choose to hold onto the property. It further fails to account for
the lack of control a mortgagor has over the sale process. On the other hand,
while the fair market approach recognizes the importance of the control aspect,
this approach does not consider a mortgagee’s potential inability to sell in a
down economy.
E. Analysis
Restitution is founded primarily on the idea that the victim should be made
whole for his property loss. The actual property that was defrauded from a
victim in mortgage fraud is the money lent as part of the real estate transaction.
Therefore, until the actual money is returned, equity has not been restored to
the victim. However, equity also demands that a victim not take advantage of
the criminal defendant and hold on to the returned real estate property longer
than necessary to sell the real estate property. Therefore, there should be a
limitation to ensure a victim does not unreasonably allow the property to lan-
guish. Accordingly, a “good faith” requirement should be included in any
amendment to the MVRA, requiring a victim to sell the property to recoup
funds with good faith. Thus, a defendant who believes a victim unfairly held
onto a property for too long may petition the court to reduce the amount of
restitution owed if the victim did not commence the sales process with good
faith.
If Congress were to amend MVRA, it should provide a definition of the
term “property” to help distinguish between properties at the different phases of
a financial transaction. Because of the diverse types of financial fraud—e.g.
mortgage fraud compared with securities fraud—the term “property” may have
more than one meaning within these contexts, and may also change throughout
the transaction. For instance, consider a scheming debtor who fraudulently
obtained a margin loan to purchase both mortgage backed securities and corpo-
rate bonds. The property “stolen” initially in this case is the fraudulently
obtained cash used to purchase the assets. However, after the margin loan is
received, the property now consists of two types of financial instruments within
the debtor’s portfolio. Indeed, the property in its current form (financial assets)
can be converted back to the form of the original property (cash). However,
with the current definition of property, it is unclear if that conversion is even
required.
The definition of property should state that “property” is defined as the
specific or particular type of asset (such as cash) that the defendant secured
from the victim. This way, the “property” returned to the victim (money) will
be the same type of property stolen (money used to purchase the home). In
addition, similar to many state statutes prohibiting insurance companies from
operating in bad faith,146 the Act should prohibit victim-lenders from operating
in bad faith.
146 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 686A.310 (2013).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Defendants, like the partners in the fictional story in the introduction,
could face varied restitution awards depending on which state they commit the
mortgage fraud in. This lack of a uniform approach results in inadequate resti-
tution to victims. If the goal of the MVRA is to make victims whole, a more
standardized and consistent calculation of restitution is required. Providing a
definition of property in the MVRA would provide this uniformity. Further,
requiring victims to act in good faith as they attempt to convert property back
to the type of asset they were deprived of will help ensure defendants aren’t
unfairly punished.
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